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NOTES

Fitting a Square Peg in a Round Hole
BITCOIN, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
Although money laundering is not new, the use of
digital currencies to launder money is. Virtual currencies like
Bitcoins, Litecoins, Liberty Reserve, Perfect Money, and
WebMoney, just to name a few, have grown in popularity over
the last four years.1 None of these digital currencies has been
more popular than Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a digital currency in
which transactions can be completed without the need for a
central bank. In a very short period of time, Bitcoin has moved
from a niche currency into what some believe will soon be a
mainstream currency.2 The rapid proliferation of the currency
has raised concerns among regulated businesses and the
government alike that fear the insidious and socially
destructive nature of money laundering.3
Money laundering is the process of taking “dirty money,”
earnings gleaned by way of illegal activity, and making the
1 See THOMSON REUTERS FRAUD & INVESTIGATION UNIT, TECHNOLOGY IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE NEW DIGITAL CURRENCY AGE (2013), available
at
http://trmcs-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/cfbf4386891bc6cb7ee26f9690294222_
20130617083834_AML%20White%20Paper.pdf [hereinafter REUTERS WHITE PAPER]; see
also Emily Flitter & Brett Wolf, Digital Currency Firms Rush to Adopt Anti-Money
Laundering Rules, REUTERS (May 31, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
05/31/us-digitalcurrency-regulation-bitcoin-idUSBRE94U17X20130531.
2 Dave Thier, Why This Entrepreneur Thinks Bitcoins Are Here to Stay,
FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthier/2013/10/
24/why-this-entrepeneur-thinks-bitcoins-are-here-to-stay/.
3 Dr. Robert Stokes, Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and Emerging
Payment Technologies, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., May 2013, at 1.
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money appear “clean” or legitimate.4 Although not codified as a
specific crime until the mid-1980s, money laundering has a
much more extensive history.5 While money laundering is
technically a non-violent crime, successful money laundering
and the criminal activities it buttresses can have a far reaching
impact as it frequently supports illicit activities including drug
trafficking and terrorism.6 As a result, “[e]ffective anti-money
laundering . . . regimes are essential to protect the integrity of
markets and of the global financial framework.”7
Although it is likely the government will avoid a
prohibition of Bitcoin,8 recent developments indicate that the
United States government will attempt to regulate Bitcoin
through existing anti-money laundering statutes.9 Regardless
of one’s opinion on this course of action, it appears that the
government’s first step in thwarting digital currency money
laundering will be effectively jamming the “modern square peg
[of Bitcoin] . . . into round regulatory holes meant for ancient
business models.”10
To effectively regulate the inherent money laundering
risks of Bitcoin, the United States government will likely need to
utilize key disclosure laws.11 These laws would require Bitcoin
owners to divulge their private key, which is similar to a
password and provides access to a user’s bitcoins. The use of such
laws may raise opposition from Bitcoin users, administrators, and
exchangers, as well as challenges from privacy rights advocates
who will likely argue that disclosure of private keys infringe upon

4 History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/
news_room/aml_history.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
5 Madelyn J. Daley, Effectiveness of United States and International Efforts
to Combat International Money Laundering, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 175, 179 (2000).
6 Shawn Turner, Note, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An
Economic Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2004).
7 Factsheet: The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing
of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/aml [hereinafter Factsheet].
8 John Aziz, We Know How Bitcoin Prohibition Would End, THE WEEK (Feb. 28,
2014), http://theweek.com/article/index/257120/we-know-how-bitcoin-prohibition-would-end.
9 See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING,
OR
USING
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
10 Marco Santori, Bitcoin Law: What US Businesses Need to Know, COINDESK (Aug.
17, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-law-what-us-businesses-need-to-know/.
11 Jon Matonis, Key Disclosure Laws Can be Used to Confiscate Bitcoin
Assets, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/09/12/keydisclosure-laws-can-be-used-to-confiscate-bitcoin-assets.
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the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.12 This
note will argue that courts will hold that the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination is violated through the
compelled production of a Bitcoin user’s private key, thus
disabling the government’s tool to thwart money laundering.
Part I explains Bitcoin’s traits and use and how these
traits increase the risk of money laundering. Part II briefly
describes money laundering. Part III illustrates the steps that
have been taken by regulatory bodies to control Bitcoin money
laundering and the government’s likely regulatory solution to
Bitcoin money laundering. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
collateral legal issue regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination that will present itself by virtue of
the implementation of compelled private key disclosure.
I.

BITCOIN: TRAITS AND USAGE

Bitcoin has emerged as a buzzword illustrative of the
burgeoning technology boom. Despite the increased prevalence
of the currency in the news and on blogs, the masses are
largely naïve as to how the currency works. Bitcoin’s complex
design, the inherent characteristics of the currency, and the
Bitcoin ecosystem require examination before there can be any
meaningful discussion of policy matters and projections for
future regulation of Bitcoin money laundering.
A.

Bitcoin’s Design

In 1998, Wei Dai wrote an article proposing an
anonymous digital currency that could operate without the need
for an intermediary and where government interjection would be
“permanently forbidden and permanently unnecessary.”13 Just
over 10 years later, and shortly after the financial crisis, Dai’s
idea was effectuated by Satoshi Nakamoto.14 Nakamoto, widely
considered an alias for either an anonymous programmer or
group of programmers,15 launched an open-source software
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Wei Dai, B-Money, http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt (last visited
Feb. 14, 2015).
14 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM,
available at http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
15 See Joshua Davis, The Crypto-Currency, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 62,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/10/the-crypto-currency;
Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/all/.
12
13
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program capable of creating an unbacked “electronic form of
floating currency.”16 With the introduction of the software
program in early 2009, Nakamoto had created Bitcoin.
Bitcoin is an online payment system whose unit of
currency goes by the same name. It is a form of digital
cryptocurrency that can be exchanged over the internet without
the need for traditional financial institutions or third parties.17
The client software relies entirely on a network of peer-to-peer
technology for the creation, management, and distribution of the
currency.18 The Bitcoin network is comparable to networks that
construct such services as BitTorrent19 and Skype.20
Unlike traditional fiat currency, bitcoins are created
through a computer-intensive process known as mining. The
system utilizes an algorithm that runs on a peer-to-peer network
of interconnected computers known as nodes.21 The technology
helps “ensure that . . . transactions are: (1) secure; (2) efficient;
and (3) free of third party presence.”22 “[C]ryptographic proof”
allows the system to be both secure and free of third party
presence.23 A cryptographic proof, also known as a “zeroknowledge proof” is a “mathematical method that can prove
something is true without revealing why it’s true.”24 “It allows
for Bitcoin miners to independently try to find the next block,
and once they do that miner [can] transmit[ ] the solution they
16 Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte
Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 165, 167 (2013).
17 Emily Stephenson & Brett Wolf, Regulators, Bitcoin Group Discuss Digital
Currency, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2013 6:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
08/26/us-financial-regulation-bitcoin-idUSBRE97P0OO20130826.
18 See Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Student Article, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the
Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 111, 115 (2012).
19 BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol that distributes file
transfers across multiple systems. This lessens the average bandwidth used by each
computer. BitTorrent, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/bittorrent
(last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
20 Skype is an internet video and telephone service that uses proprietary
protocols that incorporate a peer-to-peer structure. Encyclopedia, PC MAG.,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/51443/skype (last visited Feb. 20, 2015); see
also T.S., How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:50 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-howdoes-bitcoin-work.
21 Joshua J. Doguet, Comment, The Nature of the Form: Legal and
Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV.
1119, 1125 (2013).
22 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 116.
23 NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 1.
24 Jacob Aron, Crypotgraphic Proof Paves Way for Nuke-Free World, NEW
SCIENTIST (June 25, 2014), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22229753.200cryptographic-proof-paves-way-for-nukefree-world.html#.VCpxuSldVFp.
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found throughout the network.”25 While cryptographic proof
nearly guarantees security and the absence of third party
intervention; cryptographic proof alone neither guarantees the
privacy of those engaging in the transaction, nor does it avert the
same user from double spending the same bitcoin.26
To keep transactions private, Bitcoin utilizes public-key
encryption.27 The Bitcoin client software generates two strings of
mathematically related numbers, also known as cryptographic
keys.28 One key is private and forms the foundation of the user’s
electronic wallet.29 The other key, known as the Bitcoin address,
is public.30 The public key is used to accept Bitcoin payments. It
is often compared to an e-mail address, “public and available to
everyone[,whereas] the private key is like the password needed
to authorize messages (in this case bitcoins) to go in and out.”31
The entire Bitcoin community is able to tell that a transaction
has taken place, but there is no information connecting the
transaction to an individual.32
To solve the double-spending problem, an intensive
system-wide approval process ensues immediately after the
transaction is signed with the private key.33 The transaction is
relayed to each node on the Bitcoin network for approval.34
Once the transaction is approved through a computationally
intensive process known as Bitcoin mining, whereby each node
attempts to solve a cryptographic puzzle, the transaction is
time-stamped and added to a block chain.35 The “block chain is
a public record of Bitcoin transactions in chronological order.”36
The node or “miner” that solves the puzzle is rewarded with 25
bitcoins, thereby creating a Bitcoin ecosystem that is
completely self-sufficient without any intervention by outside
parties.37 Valid transactions are then broadcasted to the public
25 Proof of Work System, LEARN CRYPTOGRAPHY, http://learncryptography.com/
proof-of-work-system/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
26 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 116.
27 Id. at 117.
28 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 117; Stokes, supra note 3, at 2.
29 See Dion, supra note 16; Doguet, supra note 21.
30 Doguet, supra note 21, at 1126.
31 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 117.
32 NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 6.
33 Dion, supra note 16, at 168.
34 Doguet, supra note 21, at 1127.
35 Id. at 1127-28.
36 Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/
vocabulary#block-chain (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
37 J.P., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency.
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ledger.38 The entire process provides “incontestable proof of the
ownership and transactional history of each Bitcoin.”39 Further,
“the computational force required to alter the blockchain
ensures that transactions cannot be undone and that the same
coin cannot be spent twice.”40
The process of rewarding users who solve the complicated
puzzles with bitcoins creates an incentive for the user “to
support the network” while simultaneously “provid[ing] a way to
initially distribute coins into circulation.”41 However, limits have
been placed on the creation of new bitcoins.42 The value of the
reward received by miners will be halved for every 210,000
bitcoins created.43 The software automatically limits the market
to “no more than 21 million bitcoins in circulation” at one time.44
This removes the need for third-party intervention while
simultaneously creating stability in the market.45 The currency
is not subject to the “inflationary whim of whatever Federal
Reserve chief decides to print more money.”46 Further, the lack
of third-party intervention drastically lowers transaction costs.47
B.

How Bitcoin is Utilized

Bitcoins can be obtained through the process of mining48
as described above or alternatively, via purchase at an online
exchange.49 The inherent traits of the Bitcoin system rely on
intrinsic values that fluctuate based upon supply and demand.50
Regardless, Bitcoin is “currently traded on exchanges where the
price of bitcoin floats against other currencies.”51 On these
exchanges, users can exchange national fiat currencies (e.g.
USD, GBP, or Yen) for bitcoins.52
Doguet, supra note 21, at 1128.
Id.
40 Id.
41 NAKAMOTO, supra note 14, at 4.
42 Stokes, supra note 3, at 2.
43 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 121.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Andy Greenberg, Crypto Currency, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2011, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0509/technology-psilocybin-bitcoins-gavin-andresencrypto-currency.html.
47 How Bitcoin Works, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/investopedia/2013/08/01/how-bitcoin-works/.
48 See supra note 35.
49 J.P., supra note 37.
50 Id.
51 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 121.
52 Id. at 122.
38

39
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Most Bitcoin exchanges operate in a very similar
fashion, although some offer various niche services.53 One of the
most prominent of these Bitcoin exchanges is Bitstamp.54 On
Bitstamp, a user adds fiat currency to their account to conduct
an exchange for bitcoins.55 The user may also cash out their
bitcoins and receive their dollar value. Additionally, each
exchange requires users to enter into a service agreement that
lays out the rights and obligations of each party.56
Bitcoins can also be purchased directly for cash or
through PayPal or Dwolla.57 In a typical cash transaction, the
parties meet face-to-face and the owner of the bitcoins will
transfer the bitcoins over the internet, usually through e-mail,
and the purchaser will pay the agreed upon amount.58 Users
can even obtain bitcoins by using a Bitcoin ATM59 and are
available for exchange on eBay and Craigslist.60 During the
first eight days that the world’s first Bitcoin ATM began
operation in a coffee shop in Vancouver, people bought and sold
over $100,000 in Bitcoin, with approximately 80 percent of
transactions involving Bitcoin purchases and the other 20
percent involving sales of Bitcoins for cash.61
No matter how the bitcoins are garnered, they must be
stored on a personal computer, online service, or mobile
application62 known as an electronic wallet.63 The “wallet is . . . a
free open-source software program that . . . generate[s]” the
private cryptographic key and public address.64 Since there is no
cost to obtain a new electronic wallet with a new address, it is
Id. at 121.
BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE, http://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/ (last visited
Feb. 20, 2015).
55 Vitalik Buterin, Introducing the Exchanges: Bitstamp, BITCOIN MAG. (Feb.
13, 2013), http://bitcoinmagazine.com/3275/introducing-the-exchanges-bitstamp/.
56 Terms of Use, BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/terms-of-use/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2015).
57 Dion, supra note 16, at 168.
58 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 123.
59 Timothy B. Lee, People Have Bought or Sold Over $100,000 in Bitcoins
from a Vancouver ATM, Firm Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:16 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/06/people-have-bought-orsold-100000-in-bitcoins-from-a-vancouver-atm-firm-says/.
60 See REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1; Michael Carney, An Expensive
Lesson Against Selling Bitcoin on eBay, PANDO DAILY (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://pandodaily.com/2013/08/27/an-expensive-lesson-against-selling-bitcoin-on-ebay/.
61 Lee, supra note 59.
62 Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 116; A Briefing on Bitcoin, USA TODAY (Nov. 8,
2013, 12:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/21/bitcoin-q-anda/3144889/.
63 Dion, supra note 16, at 167.
64 How Bitcoin Works, supra note 47.
53
54
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extremely common for Bitcoin owners to “create a new address
for each transaction as a means of ensuring privacy and
enhancing security.”65 Anonymity is one of the most attractive
attributes of Bitcoin; the structure and ease of utilizing multiple
electronic wallets ensures that parties can engage in
transactions without divulging their user information.66
As a consequence of the growing demand for Bitcoin,
there has been a growth in the acceptance of Bitcoin in legal,
non-nefarious contexts.67 Bitcoin has been accepted by several
organizations including WikiLeaks for charitable donations.68
Further, Bitcoin is now being accepted by a number of
retailers, both on the Internet and in brick-and-mortar
facilities.69 The list includes websites Etsy and OKCupid, as
well as bars in London and New York City.70
Despite the government shutdown of a large illegal drug
network only accepting Bitcoin as consideration71 and the collapse
of what was the world’s largest Bitcoin exchange,72 the Bitcoin
market is robust, with the value of a single bitcoin reaching $582.73
At the moment, there are over 13 million bitcoins in circulation
with a market capitalization of approximately $6.4 billion.74
II.

MONEY LAUNDERING: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The anonymous, near-untraceable nature of Bitcoin has
undoubtedly attracted criminals to the currency.75 These traits
have also garnered the attention of Senators Charles Schumer
and Joe Manchin, who declared Bitcoin “an online form of
money laundering used to disguise the source of the money,” in
a June 2011 letter to the Attorney General of the United
States, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of

65
66
67
68
69

2013, at 13.

Id.
Kaplanov, supra note 18, at 126.
See Dion, supra note 16, at 169.
Id.
Andre Byrne & Will Hallatt, Bitcoin or Bitcon?, CYBERSPACE LAW., Sept.

Id.
See Kim Zetter, How the Feds Took Down the Silk Road Drug Wonderland,
WIRED (Nov. 18, 2013 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/silk-road/.
72 See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster,
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
73 See, e.g., BITCOIN WATCH, http://bitcoinwatch.com/ (value listed as of
Sept. 5, 2014).
74 Id.
75 Kurt Mattson, Senate Committee Looks Into Virtual Currencies, BSA/AML
UPDATE 1 (Oct. 15, 2013).
70
71
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Justice.76 This letter put Bitcoin under the national spotlight.
While it is likely that the money laundering risks raised by the
government and private citizens have been overstated,77 there
is certainly reason for concern.
Originally, Bitcoin was only used by proficient computer
nerds or hackers seeking anonymous payment for tasks
performed on the internet.78 Many early users also used the
currency as a statement against traditional fiat currency.79
However, the currency quickly became a mainstay in the
“underbelly of the Internet, also known as the Deep Web.”80
The anonymous nature of the Deep Web is intimately linked to
nefarious activities like “drug trafficking, arms trafficking,
terrorism and child pornography.”81
The most famous of the Deep Web sites connected to Bitcoin
is Silk Road.82 Silk Road was known to deal in illegal services and
drug sales, only accepting Bitcoin as payment.83 The extremely
popular site was shut down on October 2, 2013 by the United
States government.84 The owner, Ross Ulbricht, was arrested
several months after his pseudonym Dread Pirate Roberts was
indicted in Maryland.85 It remains unclear exactly how the F.B.I.
unmasked Ulbricht given the indictment is sealed.86 After his
arrest, Mr. Ulbricht’s bitcoins were confiscated.87 Despite the
indictment and arrest of Mr. Ulbricht, alternative illegal goods and
service websites accepting Bitcoin immediately proliferated,
including the reincarnation of Silk Road.88
76 Schumer Pushes to Shut Down Online Drug Marketplace, NBC NEW YORK
(June 5, 2011, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/123187958.html (quoting
Senator Charles Schumer) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doguet, supra
note 21, at 1142.
77 Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: Understated Benefits and Overstated Risks, THE
HILL (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/
317875-bitcoin-understated-benefits-and-overstated-risks.
78 Dion, supra note 16, at 169.
79 Id.
80 REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
81 Id.
82 Byrne & Hallatt, supra note 69.
83 Greg Thomas, The Silk Road is Shut Down, and the Owner is in Custody,
VICE (Oct. 2, 2013), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-silk-road-is-shut-down-andthe-owner-is-in-custody.
84 Id.
85 Matthew Goldstein, Silk Road Case Began with Hunt for a John Doe, N.Y.
TIMES DEALB%K (Mar. 21, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/silk-roadcase-began-with-hunt-for-a-john-doe/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
86 Id.
87 Thomas, supra note 83.
88 John Ribiero, Silk Road Drug Marketplace Rises from the Grave After
Legal Smackdown, PC WORLD (Nov. 7, 2013 6:04 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
2061800/silk-road-online-drug-marketplace-resurfaces.html.
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The Ins and Outs of Money Laundering

“Money laundering is a process by which the illicit
source of assets obtained . . . by criminal activity is concealed to
obscure the link between the funds and the original criminal
activity.”89 These “operations generally boil down to
‘a . . . complex process often using the latest technology, of
sanitising money in such a manner that its true nature, source or
use is concealed, thereby creating an apparent justification
for . . . possessing the laundered money.’”90 Consequently,
“[m]oney laundering is often a secondary process—preceded by an
illegal activity.”91 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “an
international policy-making and standard-setting body dedicated
to combating money laundering and terrorist financing,”92
estimates the amount of money laundered per year is somewhere
between 1.3 and 3.4 trillion dollars.93
The archetypal model for laundering money is a threestep process. First, dirty money is placed into a legitimate
enterprise.94 Second, the money is layered through several
transactions.95 Last, the funds are integrated “into the
‘legitimate financial world.’”96 Historically, financial institutions
and front operations were the enterprises of choice for criminals
when laundering their money.97 Today, advancements in
technology have shifted the paradigm. Digital currencies are
now a viable and attractive option for criminals looking to
launder their money.98
Although money laundering is technically a non-violent
and usually “victimless” crime, its undertaking has destructive
social consequences. FinCEN, a bureau of the Department of
Treasury whose mission includes “safeguard[ing] the financial

Factsheet, supra note 7.
GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT MODEL 83 (2000) (quoting Secretary-General of the UN, Note
Strengthening Existing International Cooperation, at 4) (omissions in original).
91 REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
92 Resource Center, Financial Action Task Force, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (Dec. 3, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terroristillicit-finance/Pages/Financial-Action-Task-Force.aspx.
93 REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
94 Turner, supra note 6, at 1392.
95 Id.
96 Id. (quoting Money Laundering, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 839, 840 (2002)).
97 Id.
98 NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 2008-R0709003, MONEY LAUNDERING IN DIGITAL CURRENCIES (June 2008).
89

90

2015]

FITTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

445

system from illicit use and combat[ing] money laundering”99
provides a bevy of harmful consequences spurred from money
laundering. “[M]oney laundering provides the fuel for drug
dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and other criminals to operate
and expand their criminal enterprises.”100 For instance,
analysts from the U.S. Department of Treasury determined
that a single money laundering operation was responsible for
supplying Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for
the September 11, 2001 attacks, with between 15 million
dollars and 20 million dollars each year.101 Further, money
laundering can have a devastating economic impact. The
International Monetary Fund suggests that money laundering
“can undermine the integrity and stability of financial
institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, and
distort international capital flows,”102 thereby disrupting a
country’s economic stability.
In light of the extreme negative consequences attributed
to money laundering, the United States and several international
partners have taken a strong approach in their anti-money
laundering strategies, which are governed by several key
statutes. In 1970, the United States passed the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) whereby any “money services businesses” (defined below)
must report financial transactions in excess of $10,000.103 The act
has since been amended several times in response to the evershifting money laundering landscape. In 1986, Congress passed
the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA), which made money
laundering a federal felony accompanied by stiff fines and lengthy
jail time.104 In 1989, the International Monetary Fund formed the
FATF.105 The FATF consists of 36 countries working in
conjunction to create a global standard for anti-money
laundering.106 In 1994, Congress passed the Money Laundering
99 What We Do, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/ (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013).
100 Frequently Asked Questions, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/
wwd/faqs.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
101 The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration’s Implementation
of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act: Hearings Before the S.
Banking Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Sec’y,
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury), available at 2002 WL 110357.
102 Factsheet, supra note 7.
103 See Bank Secrecy Act Requirements: A Quick Reference Guide for Money
Services Businesses, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/materials/
en/bank_reference.html, (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
104 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
105 REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
106 Id.
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Suppression Act that required each Money Services Business
(MSB) to be registered by an owner or controlling person of the
MSB.107 Operating an unregistered MSB became a federal
crime.108 In response to the attacks on September 11, 2001,
Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act that required banks to
more closely monitor transactions with the threat of greater civil
and criminal penalties.109 More recently, in November 2012, the
United States Treasury Department created a new anti-money
laundering task force to deal with the “‘remarkable change’
occurring in the financial industry, driven by technological and
financial innovation.”110
Bitcoin money laundering shares much in common with
archetypal money laundering. There are similarities in the overall
process of laundering funds and subsequent consequences of such
actions. However, as a vehicle for money laundering, the currency’s
unique attributes have created difficult regulatory problems.
B.

Bitcoin as a Vehicle for Money Laundering

Several risks inherent to Bitcoin make it a prime vehicle
for laundering money. First, Bitcoin users can transfer
instruments with financial value to one another without the
intervention of any third-party, including that of banks or other
financial institutions.111 This is troublesome given that the
traditional approach to thwarting money laundering is through
the use of banks or other key professionals as a policing force. The
banks or other professionals guard against money laundering by
reporting suspicious activity and “limiting the ability of criminals
to transfer value without scrutiny.”112 The risk is even greater due
to the lack of face-to-face contact in completing these transactions.
In more common-place monetary transactions, “enhanced duediligence is required where the customer is not physically
present for identification purposes.”113 That safeguard proves
impossible given the inherent traits of the Bitcoin ecosystem.
A second, interrelated issue is user anonymity in
completing transactions. As mentioned above, every Bitcoin
transfer is published to the public ledger, however, private keys
31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2011).
Id.
109 Id. §§ 5311-14, 5316-32.
110 REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1. These provisions are discussed in
greater detail and an analysis of their effect on Bitcoin and its users is in Part III infra.
111 Stokes, supra note 3, at 2.
112 Id. at 2-3.
113 Id. at 3.
107
108
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remain anonymous and “there are no records linking any public
address to an individual or organization.”114 Compounding this
issue is the ease with which a user can obtain a new public
address.115 Bitcoin users typically have multiple electronic
wallets and addresses, thereby muddying the evidentiary waters
and making it very difficult for law enforcement to efficiently
and properly investigate potential money laundering violations.
A third money laundering risk relates to the relative “speed
and ease with which Bitcoin transactions can be carried out.”116
Unlike cash, the traditional anonymous vehicle utilized to launder
money,117 money launderers utilizing Bitcoin need not worry about
cumbersome physical limitations.118 The electronic process serves a
dual feature for money launderers: it allows them to complete
domestic or international transactions within 10 minutes while
simultaneously “allow[ing] for [a] considerably easier payment
structur[e] [known as] ‘smurfing’ so as to avoid suspicion.”119
Although the inherent traits of Bitcoin pose substantial
problems for regulators,120 these problems are not
insurmountable and do not warrant a complete prohibition of
Bitcoin. The remainder of this note will discuss the government’s
burgeoning approach to the money laundering problem through
the use of anti-money laundering provisions that have already
been enacted. The government’s archetypal approach is likely to
raise collateral, constitutional consequences.121
III.

THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO BITCOIN: FITTING A
SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

The meteoric rise in the value and popularity of Bitcoin
in conjunction with the growing problem of money laundering has
led regulators to turn their attention to addressing the perceived
problem of Bitcoin as a vehicle for money laundering.122 Despite
the increased attention, United States regulators have not
explicitly cleared up the legal confusion surrounding regulating
Id.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Castillo, supra note 77.
118 Stokes, supra note 3, at 3.
119 Id.
120 Regulators are faced with a dual-identification problem. First, law
enforcement officials must be able to identify suspicious transactions. Second, if a
transaction is deemed suspicious, officials must identify the near-anonymous user or
users who completed the transaction. Id. at 2-3, 5.
121 See REUTERS WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.
122 Id.
114
115
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Bitcoin.123 Recent developments from United States federal courts
and regulatory bodies indicate that the existing money
laundering regulatory framework will guide Bitcoin regulation.
A.

Regulatory Indications from the Federal Courts

The first case indicating the United States government’s
approach to thwarting digital currency money laundering
followed the indictment of the proprietors of E-Gold by the
United States Department of Justice.124 On April 24, 2007,
shortly before the advent of Bitcoin, digital currency enterprise
E-Gold and their owners were indicted on four criminal charges.125
Each owner was indicted “with one count of conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, one count of conspiracy to operate an
unlicensed money transmitting business, one count of operating
an unlicensed money transmitting business under federal law
and one count of money transmission without a license under
D.C. law.”126 The indictment and subsequent guilty plea of the
owners and directors of E-Gold illustrate the interplay between
Section 1960,127 the BSA,128 and the MLCA,129 all tools that will
likely be used against Bitcoin.130
Section 1960 imposes penalties on anyone who
“knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs or
owns all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting
business.”131 This statute directly relates to the BSA that
requires “a wide-swath of otherwise unregulated financial
institutions to register with the government, implement antimoney laundering procedures, keep data, and report certain
transactions and other data.”132 The term “money services
business” is defined as:

123 Timothy B. Lee, New Money Laundering Guidelines are a Positive Sign for
Bitcoin, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/03/19/newmoney-laundering-guidelines-are-a-positive-sign-for-bitcoin/.
124 Bitcoiners: Remember What Happened to eGold, ECON. POL’Y J. (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2013/04/bitcoiners-remember-what-happened-to.html.
125 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold
Indicted for Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html.
126 Id.
127 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2010).
128 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012).
129 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
130 United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 (D.D.C. 2008).
131 Id.
132 Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 204 (2012).
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A person wherever located doing business . . . in one or more of the
[following] capacities[:]. . . .(1) Dealer in foreign exchange . . . . (2) Check
casher . . . . (3) Issuer or seller of traveler’s checks or money orders . . . . (4)
Provider of prepaid access . . . . (5) Money transmitter . . . . (6) U.S. Postal
Service . . . . [or] (7) Seller of prepaid access.133

In E-Gold, the defendants argued they were not a “money
transmitting business” under the BSA and therefore could not be
held liable under Section 1960.134 The court rejected the
defendants’ argument, holding that the legislative intent of
Section 5330, a statute laying forth money transmitting business
registration requirements, “expose[s] an intent to regulate
‘financial institutions,’ not just ‘currency transmitters’ or
‘financial institutions that engage in currency transactions.’”135
Precedent had been set that one does not need to engage in cash
transactions to qualify as a money transmitting business.
Prosecutors also brought charges against E-Gold under
the Money Control Act of 1986.136 Generally, this statute “applies
to individuals who conduct a financial transaction involving
dirty money, knowing that the money is dirty, with the intent of
promoting certain kinds of illegal activities, concealing the dirty
money’s origin, or avoiding a reporting requirement.”137 The
scienter requirement can be met through the concept of willful
blindness.138 The charges were brought and sustained based on
the fact that E-Gold “allowed its users to remain anonymous,
maintained staff without financial experience, and did not
respond to customer complaints concerning fraud.”139
Although the case did not make it to trial, E-Gold
indicated that certain digital currency businesses—“even those
located abroad—must register under both federal . . . law or
face criminal penalties.”140 Additionally, the court indicated
that digital currency businesses or individuals who “knowingly
process dirty money, make a profit on those transactions, and
do nothing to stop processing those transactions, . . . may be
guilty of money laundering.”141 Although the facts relating to EGold and the nature of E-Gold as a digital currency are clearly
31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (ff) (2013).
E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
135 Id. at 97.
136 Grinberg, supra note 132, at 204.
137 Id. at 205.
138 Frans J. von Kaenel, Willful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual
Knowledge Under the Money Laundering Control Act?, 71 WASH.U. L.Q. 1189, 1191 (1993).
139 Dion, supra note 16, at 179-80.
140 Grinberg, supra note 132, at 206.
141 Id.
133
134
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distinguishable from Bitcoin, the ruling was the first opinion
from the federal courts regarding the status of digital currency
providers as MSBs. The opinion is also an indication that
regulatory bodies will likely treat Bitcoin miners and exchanges
as MSBs in their attempt to inhibit digital currency money
laundering in the future.
B.

Regulatory Indications from FinCEN

In the years following E-Gold, FinCEN “amend[ed]
definitions and other regulations relating to money services
businesses.”142 In early 2013, the government became active
regarding the regulation of Bitcoin. On March 18, 2013,
FinCEN143 issued interpretative guidance “to clarify the
applicability of the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy
Act to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging,
accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies.”144 This guidance
coincided with the astronomical gains in both the intrinsic
worth and the notoriety of Bitcoin.
Without mentioning Bitcoin by name, FinCEN provided
its opinion of how to read Bitcoin into the statutory provisions.
In essence, a “user who obtains convertible virtual currency
and uses it to purchase real or virtual goods or services is not an
MSB under FinCEN’s regulations.”145 However, administrators
and exchangers of virtual currency are money transmitters under
FinCEN’s regulations.146 The guidance indicates that FinCEN is
not interested in Bitcoin users or in regulating the Bitcoin
network.147 The guidance does indicate that digital currency
exchanges, like Bitstamp are not exempt to the BSA or the
MLCA. Additionally, the guidance seems to indicate that
Bitcoin miners must register as MSBs.148
FinCEN’s guidance has drawn a multitude of reactions.
Some Bitcoin advocates believe that the paper is “the first step
in a federal crackdown on Bitcoin.”149 Others feel that the
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 9.
FinCEN has authority to issue guidance under its authority to administer
the BSA. See Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar. 24, 2003).
144 FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 9.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Lee, supra note 123.
148 Bailey Reutzel, Fincen Says Digital Currency Guidance Stands, but Talks
Continue, PAYMENTS SOURCE (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.paymentssource.com/
news/fincen-says-digital-currency-guidance-stands-but-talks-continue-3015241-1.html.
149 Lee, supra note 123.
142

143
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guidelines are a clear indication that FinCEN is not interested
in regulating the Bitcoin network, a seemingly positive sign.150
Others in the Bitcoin community are confused by the
guidance.151 Individual and collective miners, extremely
important facets of the Bitcoin ecosystem, are unsure of their
regulatory requirements due to the ambiguity of the
interpretive guidance.152
In the months following the release of FinCEN’s
guidance, Bitcoin began to grow in both popularity and value.153
As mentioned above, the government indicted Ross Ulbricht
and shut down his popular website known as the Silk Road
shortly before the release of FinCEN’s guidance.154 In response,
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs “engaged in an investigation into the potential
implications of virtual currencies.”155 On November 18, 2013, the
Senate Committee held a fact-finding hearing where law
enforcement officials and proponents of Bitcoin testified to both
the potential promises and pitfalls of the digital currency.156
While some proponents of the virtual currency feared
the congressional hearing on Bitcoin could result in a
regulatory crackdown,157 the government did not propound
regulation any more stringent than the regulatory framework
proposed in FinCEN’s guidance.158 During the hearing, the
government described its “approach to virtual currencies, [its]
recent successes in prosecuting criminals who use virtual
currencies for illicit purposes, and some of the challenges [it]
Id.
Reutzel, supra note 148.
152 Michael Carnery, FinCEN to Bitcoin Miners: No Need to Register if the Bitcoins
are for Your Own Use, PANDO DAILY (Dec. 30, 2013), http://pando.com/2013/12/30/fincen-tobitcoin-miners-no-need-to-register-if-the-bitcoins-are-for-your-own-use/.
153 Jose Paglieri, Senate Takes a Close Look at Bitcoin, CNN MONEY (Nov. 18,
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/18/technology/bitcoin-regulation/.
154 See Goldstein, supra note 85.
155 Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats and Promises of Virtual
Currencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
113th Cong. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Beyond Silk Road] (statement of Thomas R. Carper,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs).
156 Rob Wile, Bitcoin Crosses $700 as Senate Hearing Wraps, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
18, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/senate-bitcoin-hearing-2013-11.
157 Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed Washington, WASH. POST
(Nov. 21, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/
21/heres-how-bitcoin-charmed-washington//?print=1.
158 Compare FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 9 (offering
guidance that would require Bitcoin administrators and exchangers to comply with
existing anti-money laundering regulations), with Beyond Silk Road, supra note 155,
(statement of Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div. of the U.S., at 3)
(stressing importance to law enforcement interests that virtual currency systems “comply
with applicable anti-money laundering and know-your-customer controls”).
150
151
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face[s] as virtual currency systems continue to evolve.”159
Rather than being a tumultuous precursor to a crackdown on
the virtual currency, the hearing was described as a “lovefest”
between the government and Bitcoin proponents.160
Although “lovefest” may be an overstatement, the hearing
was certainly cordial. In her testimony, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Mythili Raman, conceded that digital currency systems
“offer legitimate financial services and have the potential to
promote more efficient global commerce,”161 while simultaneously
recognizing the Department of Justice’s law enforcement concerns
and interests in these currencies.162 According to Ms. Raman, the
Department of Justice has two primary interests in regulating
virtual currency: deterring and prosecuting individuals using
virtual currencies to launder money and prosecuting virtual
currency services that violate laws designed to thwart money
laundering.163 While acknowledging the inherent characteristics
of Bitcoin—that is, its ability to “conduct transfers quickly,
securely, and often with a . . . higher level of anonymity
than . . . traditional financial services,”164—Ms. Raman stressed
that law enforcement interests can be met as long as the Bitcoin
ecosystem “compl[ies] with applicable anti-money laundering and
know-your-customer controls.”165 While recognizing some unique
challenges attributed to the currency, i.e. the need for international
cooperation and the difficulties in obtaining customer records,166
the Department of Justice indicated that it too would attempt to fit
Bitcoin into the existing regulatory framework.167
IV.

THE TENSION BETWEEN MONEY LAUNDERING
REGULATIONS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

In light of FinCEN’s guidance and the recent
Congressional hearing, it has become clear that the government’s
159 Beyond Silk Road, supra note 155, (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div. of the U. S., at 1).
160 Lee, supra note 157.
161 Beyond Silk Road, supra note 155, (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div. of the U.S., at 1).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 The difficulty of obtaining customer records is a larger problem than Ms.
Raman has admitted. The Fifth Amendment issues associated with key disclosure laws
are discussed in Section IV.A.
167 Beyond Silk Road, supra note 155, (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div. of the U.S., at 5).
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approach to thwarting “Bitcoin-centric” money laundering will
center on existing anti-money laundering laws.168 While the
framework the government has signaled it will use to confront the
money laundering problem will be partially successful, the
approach will encounter potentially insurmountable challenges.
Even if administrators and exchangers are forced to register and
abide by existing anti-money laundering regulations and knowyour-customer controls, the inherent structure of Bitcoin leaves
serious problems for regulators.
Regulatory bodies and investigators will find it difficult
both to track criminals using Bitcoin and to seize their criminal
proceeds. Even if the government can locate the customer
records they wish to obtain—a difficult task due to the lack of a
central administering authority—the digital wallets that
contain the valuable evidence and criminal proceeds will be
encrypted with a private key.169 The government will then be
forced to utilize a subpoena duces tecum in order to obtain this
evidence and effectively prosecute and eliminate money
laundering. As one commentator has posited, “[k]ey disclosure
laws may become the most important government tool in asset
seizures and the war on money laundering.”170
A.

The Fifth Amendment

Although compelled key disclosure might “become the
most important government tool”171 in hampering Bitcoin as a
vehicle for money laundering, forcing a suspect to provide the
government with the private key necessary to decrypt the
electronic wallet raises substantial self-incrimination issues. The
Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”172
However, “the Fifth Amendment does not independently
proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating
evidence.”173 It “protects a person . . . against being incriminated
by his own compelled testimonial communications.”174
Consequently, the evidence must be testimonial in nature,
meaning that the communication “itself, explicitly or implicitly,
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

See infra Part III.B.
See supra note 29.
Matonis, supra note 11.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
Id. at 409.
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relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information.”175 Worded
alternatively, it is “the attempt to force [an accused] ‘to disclose
the contents of his own mind’ that implicates the SelfIncrimination Clause.”176 In many cases where the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is asserted, the
focus is simply on whether the act is testimonial.
B.

Analogous Case Law

Several recent cases have considered whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a
defendant from being compelled to divulge his or her password
of encryption key.177 The first case to do so is In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher.178 In 2006, Sebastien Boucher
crossed the Canadian border at Derby Line, Vermont when a
Customs and Border Protection inspector performed a secondary
inspection of Mr. Boucher’s car.179 The inspector noticed a laptop
in the car, “which Mr. Boucher acknowledged as his” own.180
Upon searching the computer, a Special Agent for Immigration
and Customs Enforcement uncovered files that appeared to
contain child pornography.181 Boucher admitted to downloading
pornography and stated that he occasionally unintentionally
downloaded child pornography, but quickly deleted the files
upon realization of their contents.182 Boucher showed the agent
some of the files, several of which appeared to be child
pornography.183 He was arrested and the laptop was seized.184
When the government attempted to duplicate the contents
of the laptop, they discovered the drive containing the
pornographic images was encrypted and could only be accessed
with a password.185 The government sought a grand jury
subpoena compelling Mr. Boucher to “produce the password.”186
“Boucher moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the act of
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
Id. at 211 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957))
(internal citation omitted).
177 Matonis, supra note 11.
178 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
179 Id. at *1.
180 Id.
181 Id. at *2.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
175

176

2015]

FITTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

455

production of this information would violate his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.”187 The subpoena required
Mr. Boucher to provide the government with an “unencrypted
version” of the drive containing the images.188 The magistrate
judge granted Mr. Boucher’s motion to quash and the
government appealed.189
The issue presented for the District of Vermont on appeal
was “whether requiring Boucher to produce an unencrypted
version of his laptop . . . would constitute compelled testimonial
communication.”190 In deciding the motion, the court relied on
the foregone conclusion doctrine.191 The doctrine states, “Where
the existence and location of the documents are known to the
government, ‘no constitutional rights are touched,’ because these
matters are a ‘foregone conclusion.’”192 Because “the
government . . . kn[ew] of the existence and location” of the
incriminating files, and “providing access to the unencrypted
[files] ‘adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s
information’ about the existence and location of files that may
contain incriminating information,” Mr. Boucher had no Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse the subpoena.193 As a “forgone
conclusion,” Mr. Boucher’s sharing of the password was not
testimonial in nature.
In 2010, a district court facing the same issue applied a
similar analysis but did not use the term “foregone conclusion.” In
United States v. Fricosu,194 the FBI executed a search warrant on
Ramona Fricosu’s residence.195 During the search, the FBI seized
six computers, one of which was password-protected by an
encryption program.196 Shortly after the execution of the search
warrant, the police intercepted a phone call made between Ms.
Fricosu and her ex-husband, who was incarcerated.197 During the
phone call, Ms. Fricosu tacitly acknowledged ownership of the
computer and alluded to the presence of incriminating files on the
encrypted hard drive.198 As a result of the conversation, the
government sought a court-ordered writ that would “requir[e] Ms.
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3-4 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Col. 2012).
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1234-35.
Id. at 1235.
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Fricosu to produce the unencrypted contents of the [laptop].”199
Ms. Fricosu declined to produce the files asserting her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.200
The District of Colorado ordered Ms. Fricosu to decrypt
the hard drive, relying on the reasoning applied in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher.201 Without utilizing the
phrase “foregone conclusion,” the court applied the doctrine. In
ordering the decryption of the drive, the court said, “the
government kn[ew] of the existence and location of the computer’s
files. The fact that it d[id] not know the specific content of any
specific documents [was] not a barrier to production.”202 The facts
available to the government made the production of the files a
foregone conclusion, and thus, not sufficiently testimonial to
trigger the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
The most recent case to address whether a password is
considered testimony is In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated March 25, 2011.203 In 2010, in the midst of a child
pornography investigation, the FBI tracked John Doe to a hotel
room and executed a search warrant for all of his digital media,
seizing seven different devices.204 FBI examiners were unable to
access certain files due to their encryption.205 The government
served Doe with a grand jury subpoena that required him to
produce the unencrypted contents of the files.206
Doe declined to comply with the subpoena, asserting
that compliance would be in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.207 Doe claimed “by decrypting
the contents, he would be testifying that he, as opposed to some
other person, placed the contents on the hard drive, encrypted
the contents, and could retrieve and examine them whenever
he wished.”208 The Eleventh Circuit held “[t]he Fifth
Amendment protects Doe’s refusal to decrypt and produce the
contents of the media devices because the act of decryption and
production would be testimonial, and because the Government
cannot show that the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applies.”209
Id.
Id.
201 Id. at 1237-38.
202 Id.
203 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d
1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
204 Id. at 1339.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 1339-40.
209 Id. at 1349.
199
200
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In deciding the case, the Eleventh Circuit utilized a twostep analysis.210 First, the court must decide if what the
government seeks to compel “is testimonial in character.”211
Second, if the produced content is testimonial in character, “the
question becomes whether the purported testimony is a ‘foregone
conclusion.’”212 In answering the first prong, the court determined
that decryption and production is “tantamount to testimony by
Doe of his knowledge of the existence and location of
potentially incriminating files; of his possession, control, and
access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his
capability to decrypt the files.”213
As to the second prong, the court determined that the
testimony was not a “foregone conclusion.”214 In making this
determination, the court said “[n]othing in the record . . . reveals
that the Government knows whether any files exist and are
located on the hard drives.”215 Additionally, “nothing in the
record illustrates that the Government knows with reasonable
particularity that Doe is even capable of accessing the
encrypted portions of the drives.”216
Relying on both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits,217 the court
said “[w]here the location, existence, and authenticity of the
purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the
contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him, and
therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.”218
Because the testimony was not a “foregone conclusion,” Fifth
Amendment protection was available for Doe.

Id. at 1346.
Id.
212 Id. The analysis used by the court is very similar to the framework used in In
re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher and United States v. Fricosu. However, the
opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 is far more
detailed and clear. This can likely be attributed to the fact the Court of Appeals took more
time to craft an opinion it felt would be widely read and scrutinized.
213 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d
1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 320-21 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004).
218 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d
at 1344 (internal footnotes omitted).
210
211
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The Fifth Amendment’s Application to Bitcoin Private
Keys

The government’s approach to virtual currency
prosecutions, regulatory interpretive guidance, and federal
precedent in password decryption cases provide the roadmap for a
future Bitcoin money laundering prosecution. It is quite likely the
government will subpoena a Bitcoin administrator, exchanger, or
user for a privacy key to decrypt their virtual wallet. There are
three reasons this prediction will come to light. First, the United
States government has recently turned its attention to both
Bitcoin and thwarting money laundering where Bitcoin is the
conduit. Second, the government has acknowledged the difficulty
Bitcoin’s encryption creates in both obtaining valuable evidence
and seizing criminal proceeds.219 Third, the government has
signaled they will utilize existing regulations and laws to derail
Bitcoin money laundering.220 The eventual subpoena, compelling
an accused Bitcoin money launderer to divulge their private key
or decrypt their virtual wallet, will almost certainly be met with a
Fifth Amendment challenge asserting a violation of one’s privilege
against self-incrimination. It is likely the court will protect the
privilege, fettering law enforcement in its attempt to prosecute
money laundering.221
Although the challenge will spawn a case of first impression
and the case will turn heavily on its facts, synthesizing the three
aforementioned cases provides a framework with which one can
predict the outcome of the future Bitcoin private key disclosure
cases. In a hypothetical case, the government will become aware of
a potential money launderer, likely through the use of current antimoney laundering regulations and know-your-customer rules. If
the government can locate the suspected money launderer, a
difficult task because “[t]here are no records linking any public
address to an individual or organization,”222 they will likely bring
criminal charges under the MLCA.223 However, the government
will be unable to access the alleged criminal proceeds located in
the suspect’s digital wallet. This is due to one of Bitcoin’s crucial
attributes as a cryptocurrency: the partial anonymity and privacy
219 Beyond Silk Road, supra note 155, (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div. of the U.S., at 6).
220 See supra Part III.
221 Joe Palazzolo, Court: Fifth Amendment Protects Suspects from Having to
Decrypt Hard Drives, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2012/02/23/court-fifth-amendment-protects-suspects-from-decrypting-computers/.
222 Stokes, supra note 3, at 3.
223 Grinberg, supra note 132.
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afforded by the need for a private key to decrypt the wallet.224
Unable to access the alleged criminal proceeds, the government
will subpoena the suspect.225 The subpoena will be met with a
Fifth Amendment challenge from the alleged money launderer.
Relying on analogous case law,226 the court will first
need to determine if the act of entering a private key or
decrypting a Bitcoin wallet is a compelled testimonial act. It is
likely the court will determine the requested production is
testimonial in nature. The witness will be forced to disclose
information that exists in the suspect’s mind, a key factor in
determining if an act is testimonial. 227 Further, “[c]ompelled
testimony that communicates information that may ‘lead to
incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the information
itself is not inculpatory.”228 The court would likely find the
compulsion testimonial in nature, thus implicating the
accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege.
Next, the court would need to make a legal determination,
based upon the facts, as to “whether the purported testimony is a
‘foregone conclusion.’”229 Given the anonymity of Bitcoin and the
relative “speed and ease with which Bitcoin transactions can be
carried out,”230 it is likely the government will be scant on
information regarding the alleged illegal transactions. The
“foregone conclusion” doctrine applies when “any testimonial
value derived from the act of production [is] already known to the
Government and therefore [the production] add[s] nothing to its
case.”231 Further, the Eleventh Circuit’s input of the “reasonable
particularity” doctrine into the “foregone conclusion” framework
creates the likelihood that the first court to hear this case will use
the more exacting standard.232

See Kaplanov, supra note 18.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670
F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Col.
2012); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL
4246473 (D. Vt. Feb. 29, 2009).
226 See cases cited supra note 225.
227 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670
F.3d at 1345.
228 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (quoting Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988)).
229 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d
at 1346.
230 Stokes, supra note 3, at 3.
231 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d
at 1346 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009
WL 4246473, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009)).
232 Id. at 1346.
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Given the Bitcoin ecosystem’s inherent characteristics,233
it will be quite difficult for the government to “show with
‘reasonable particularity’ that, at the time it sought to compel
the act of production, it already knew of the materials, thereby
making any testimonial aspect a ‘foregone conclusion.’”234 It is
likely the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination protects a suspected Bitcoin money launderer
against compelled divulgence of a private key or decrypted
password to their virtual wallet.
CONCLUSION
According to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Bitcoin[ has]
captured the imagination of some, struck fear among others,
and confused the heck out of many of us.”235 His assertion is
correct. The mostly anonymous, very secure, and extremely
liquid cryptocurrency has skyrocketed in both value and allure
since its introduction to the internet in 2009. With its increased
value and allure, Bitcoin has “seen increased attention from
regulators, law enforcement, investors, and entrepreneurs.”236
Regulators and law enforcement officials are primarily concerned
with Bitcoin’s potential for money laundering and the devastating
economic and social consequences associated with money
laundering, while investors and entrepreneurs are excited by the
potential advent of a valuable and stable global currency.237
The United States government has yet to crackdown on
Bitcoin. In recent months, government officials have signaled
that they will take a “wait and see” approach while
concomitantly utilizing existing anti-money laundering laws
including the MLCA, the BSA, and know-your-customer laws
to combat the money laundering problem. There appears to be
an attempt to balance the potentially valuable attributes of
Bitcoin, including its ability to add financial stability in
developing countries, lower transaction costs, and remove
third-party intermediaries, with its potential for nefarious
activities, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and
233
234

at 1346.
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child exploitation.238 There is little doubt the government will
not wait to use the tools currently at their disposal to thwart
Bitcoin money laundering.239
A crucial tool the government will likely utilize is its
subpoena power in an attempt to access a suspected money
launderer’s virtual wallet to obtain evidence and seize potentially
criminal proceeds. This subpoena will be met with a Fifth
Amendment challenge from the accused. Although there are no
cases directly on point, other cases involving the forced
compulsion of passwords or decrypted files provide a serviceable
analog with which to predict the outcome of the inevitable Bitcoin
case. It is my belief that the forced compulsion of a private Bitcoin
key violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination “because the act of decryption and production
would be testimonial, and because the [g]overnment [will not be
able to] show that the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine applies.”240
It is unclear whether Bitcoin will “prove to be a boom or
a bust,”241 but the potential for Bitcoin’s impact on both the
American economy and jurisprudence is immense and perhaps
harmful without effective regulation. Although Bitcoin’s future
is far from certain, the currency deserves the attention it has
received and will continue to receive from regulators, law
enforcement officials, academics, entrepreneurs, and curious
people alike.
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